Once There Were Warriors

by Dennis Barlow, Col., USA ret.

"Marse" Lee, during a crucial moment during the battle of Spotsylvania, flung his hat to the ground and spurred Traveler on to lead the culminating charge of his beloved Virginians and Georgians into the cockpit of the battle. His men, aghast at the prospect of losing their beloved leader, in a chorus shouted, "Lee to the rear! Lee to the rear! WeÕll lick Ôem for ya General!" When Lee refused their entreaties, a tough old sergeant jerked LeeÕs horse rearward and out of harmÕs way while the main body streamed forward, now on fire and invincible.

Such a scene is inconceivable in todayÕs Army. This is so, not because of the obsolescence of horse cavalry, or even because of the dedication of the force, but because of the mentality of the topmost brass. Loyalty down and personal courage are all but relics of AmericaÕs martial past.

Many of the three and four star flag officers assigned to the Pentagon march to the beat of a different drummer. They are acutely aware of, and sensitive to, every political nuance. They are consumed with planning ahead for lucrative post-active service roles with prestigious "beltway bandits" - the consultants with very top-heavy boards to whom innumerable Defense contracts are "outsourced" - or as political appointees, or media advisors. And of course the three star generals incubate their probable (almost assured) promotions by protecting the political and social flanks of their bosses. The key to landing plum post-active duty positions, is simply not to cause any controversy; certainly not anything that may tinged with sexism, displaying a zeal for developing robust war fighting capabilities, or being associated with any comment which may connote a wisp of criticism about the current administrationÕs use, abuse or misuse of the force.

These flag officers, along with high-ranking Defense Department civilian appointees, have very large staffs of crack mid-range career officers. These field grade officers: majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels, are highly rated "Type A" leaders who are hoping to get a command assignment or go to a Senior Service academy. They are extremely bright and dedicated subject matter experts who are on top of their game. One would expect them to exercise quite a bit of independence and latitude in their jobs. Not so.

The Army staff concept is an excellent management organization designed to allow someone assigned to a specific area of competence to percolate ideas as part of an interwoven group and recommend actions to his or her chief. Current Pentagon practices turn that concept on its head. There, staff officers are institutionally discouraged from raising ideas up the authority chain. It is very quickly learned in the Pentagon that one merely awaits the needs of the "elephants" and does not try to be personally proactive.

As an example, a recommended action for post-conflict civil military action in Panama was sent by the appropriate staff officer to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It never got near him. There were seventeen different officers, each of whom had to agree to endorse the idea before it would be presented to the Boss. Each one of those officials asked himself a series of questions such as "Will this make me look stupid? What if the boss doesnÕt like it? Can this thing backfire on me?" The suggested actions, while within Army doctrine, were not routine combat activities; therefore the recommendations, entering into the realm of the unknown for some Pentagon bureaucrats, were shelved early. It was only after days of riotous anarchy in the streets of post-combat Panama City, that the idea was resurrected. Suppose the recommendation had received a blessing within the Joint Staff? The proposal, now in the form of a package, would have had to endure an arduous, and arcane odyssey through the Pentagon. It would have to receive the unanimous blessings of many organizations, some not at all involved in the issue. Sometimes these organizations, such as individual services, use such opportunities to weigh in on a pet rock issue not germane to the matter at hand. It is a rare occurrence indeed for a staff-generated recommendation to be enacted.

The second unwritten organizational practice in the Pentagon is that the major players - known as Pachyderms Ð Janus-like Ð wear two faces. One is for their minions and staff, and the other is for the rest of the world. As supervisor of a group of officers, they generally require extremely long hours of staff members; thirteen hours a day is not unusual even during routine times. Staffers are often treated dismissively, and with detached disdain by their bosses. This attitude is all the more demoralizing because of the stark contrast it affords as compared to the obsequious behavior of their leaders when in the presence of important civilians outside the staff.

There are numerous cases of senior officials throwing telephones at their staffers, pushing and shoving them, and tasking them with absolutely superfluous work, which often keeps the officer at work until the wee hours of the morning. During the early stages of the Gulf War one well known three-star general regularly and openly ridiculed members of his staff simply because of the branch to which they belonged. Even though he accepted the many medals for which he was recommended, he dumped the single award recommendation, which one of his staff had earned, in the trash when he discovered that the officer was a Reservist Ð an appellation to be avoided on his staff.

The "drive Ôem til they drop" style seems to stem from the belief that these dedicated staffers abound; that they are so invested in their careers that they cannot complain or leave, and can replaced by another face fresh from the War College or other preparatory assignment with no harm done to the Pentagon. It would be a rare mid-level officer who would treat privates in the field with the callousness and disregard, which often hallmark the daily life of the Pentagon field-grade staffer.

The other face of the Pentagon flag officer is turned to public relations. He is often called upon to cater to the informational or ceremonial needs of executive and legislative branch officials, the press, and visitors. The snarling, hard-driving, no-excuses, fire breather is invariably transformed into a most charming, sensitive, and understanding father figure. He prepares for hours for these ordeals (one general used to have a staff of twenty officers regularly "murder board" him before his daily press briefing) all the while regaling both subordinates and peers with gruff and witty words of derision about the guest. When the visit occurs, the general or admiral is patient, sweet, and dutifully attentive, but almost invariably unhelpful, allowing virtually no useful information to pass his lips.

With regard to current missions, there are some who say the peacekeeping and humanitarian roles recently undertaken are the real morale busters for our military. This is not so. The majority of soldiers deployed to Saudi Arabia; Kurdistan; Kuwait; Haiti; Somalia; Bosnia, and Kosovo, are extremely proud of the lives they have saved ands the skills they have honed and applied. The problem has not been the new missions; the U.S. Army, like all great armies in history, has learned to be flexible and agile. The problem has been that the brass in the Pentagon accepts these new missions without receiving or requiring proper guidance on policy objectives, approved methodologies Ð and of course Ð with the tacit acknowledgment that no American will become a casualty. The resultant confusion and mission overkill is invariably passed to the commander on the ground who has to discern, usually through trial and error, what his real missions and tactics should be.

The reasons for AmericaÕs deployments to support these missions have sometimes been murky, the rules of engagement unclear, and procedures often dysfunctional. In Haiti thousands of soldiers stayed hunkered down in camps with absolutely nothing to do because their role on the ground was unclear. The U.S. never really decided whether it wanted to perform civic action missions or avoid "nation-building" activities. In Somalia, we never decided how the rival factions were to be treated; the result was the tragic loss of American lives Ð along with the mission. In Bosnia, long after the conflict was over, and in the midst of thriving towns, and business as usual, American GIs dug embarrassingly into fox holes wearing helmets, flak jackets, and full combat gear as quizzical civilians went about their daily chores. In post Iraq-controlled Kuwait some U.S. soldiers were decorated and others reprimanded for taking on-the-spot actions against human rights violations. Even in the midst of the Gulf War, very urgent requests from field commanders for mission clarification were given responses crafted by teams of Pentagon lawyers whose primary goal seemed to be to provide political cover and wiggle room for their bosses.

Others say troops are bailing out over low the pay and allowances. This also is not the root of the matter. There have always been Americans who have answered the call to the colors no matter what the salary. That will never change. What has changed is that the likes of George Washington, William Sherman, George Patton, and Creighton Abrams - courageous warfighters who motivated troops within an environment of unquestioned loyalty and insist on definable and attainable goals - are no longer being groomed and promoted. Now the ones who generally make the cut are the dilettantes who provide plausible deniability for their bosses, mollify the Congress and the press, chivvy their own staff and subordinates, and make certain that no controversial ideas are identified with him or his office.

Changing the institutional imprint of an organization as large as the Pentagon is not easy. It certainly is not going to be easy to change under an administration which does not value Ð perhaps even understand - the roles and contributions of its military forces. And it will not be easy to redirect a generation of officers who have been groomed to succeed in a squishy, politically correct environment. However the good news, is that this specific problem is not budget related. ItÕs a vision thing.

If the civilian leadership of this country could articulate a concept of an Army truly honored and honorably treated, trained for warfighting, and existing outside the realm of beltway or pork barrel economics and politics, we could see a new sense of pride associated with serving the profession of arms. A few men have been able to change the imprint of an American Army. Washington, Lee, Grant, Pershing, and Eisenhower were able to put the soul of the Army above political and personal considerations. Can we Ð or perhaps more to the point Ð do we have the will to - find such a leader and give him the charter to return the esprit to the officer corps and the military? Or will we persist in making our military services the focal point for the administrationÕs social projects, a chess piece for political maneuvering, an expendable source of administrative help, and a reservoir of easily accessible and deployable diplomatic fodder?

[Note: The author is a former Army Colonel who spent seven years in policy and planning positions within the Pentagon.]

© 2003, Dennis Barlow. Use with written permission only.